Turkey's domestic politics further in the direction of the 'pro-EU coalition' which had already been gathering strength particularly since the Helsinki decision of 1999 granting Turkey the candidate status. Moreover, the more credible set of incentives from the EU since the Helsinki summit, in addition to giving momentum to Turkey's transition from a procedural to substantive democracy and helping to transform its economy, also gave way to a closer alignment of Turkey's foreign policy with the major European powers leading to a relative 'Europeanization' of Turkish foreign policy. Finally, the fact that short-term dynamics appear to favor closer relations between Turkey and the EU, should not lead to the misleading interpretation that Turkey would be able to achieve smooth and rapid progress towards EU membership in the absence of US support. While in the December 2004 summit the EU has set a date to start the accession negotiations with Turkey, the thorny path towards Turkey's full membership is still full of difficulties and uncertainties. In this long and arduous journey, maintaining the US support would be an important asset for Turkey particularly on critical issues such as Cyprus.
Hence, it is vitally important from a Turkish perspective that the partnership with the US is restored and placed on a sound footing. This is also important for the future course of Turkey-EU relations. Indeed, we argue that the restoration and further deepening of the Turkey-EU-US triangle is of overriding importance. Not only will closer relations with the US continue to assist Turkey's quest for EU membership, but also Turkey, not as an isolated state but as a member of the EU, will be in a far more advantageous position in developing a more balanced relationship with the United States. This, in turn, will enable Turkey to protect its national interests better and to play a more constructive role in the wider Middle East as a 'benign regional power.' In this respect, a 'benign regional power' differentiates itself from a 'coersive regional power' in the sense that the latter is much more likely to resort to force to exert its influence in the surrounding region.
Finally, we remain confident that the temporary setback in Turkey-US relations can be restored and the triangular relationship involving Turkey, the EU and the US can be reconstituted on a stronger basis. Yet, the optimistic assessment for Turkey's future prospects should be qualified by the fact that serious challenges need to be overcome both with respect to relations with the EU and the US. The passive 'wait and see' attitude based on the vague notion of 'geo-strategic importance' will not be very helpful in this context. What is required is an active strategy designed to improve relations with the EU and the US simultaneously.
Yet, the ability to develop and activate such a strategy depends critically on the interplay of contending forces in Turkey's domestic political arena and the dynamics of the transatlantic relations in the international scene.
Turkey at the Gates of Europe: The Historical Context, Recent Developments and the

Significance of the Copenhagen Summit
The roots of Turkey's long march toward Europe predate the Republican period and may be traced back to the Ottoman times. European orientation meant westernization, enlightenment and a move towards modernity. In formal terms, Turkey, together with Greece, was one of the first countries to develop relations with the emerging European Community (EC) in the early 1960s, signing an associate agreement in 1963.
1 Yet, Turkey's relationship with the Community did not follow a smooth trajectory. The Community has for a long time been unreceptive to Turkey's full membership on the grounds of the country's size, level of development and its predominantly Muslim identity. 2 It is fair to say that the EU in the 1990s has been far more receptive to incorporate post-communist states such as Poland and Hungary into its orbit, because these countries did not pose the kind of boundary questions for Europe that the Turkish membership appeared to entail. 3 For the EC/EU in the 1980s and the 1990s, Turkey, rather than being a 'natural insider', was an 'important outsider' with whom relations ought to be developed on an arm's length basis barring full integration.
Turkey's domestic politics did not help in this respect either. In retrospect, the failure to convert the military intervention in Cyprus in 1974 to an internationally acceptable political settlement has proved to be rather costly for Turkey's fortunes involving relations with Europe. Indeed, the Cyprus intervention has set into motion a series of forces leading to the democratization and subsequent membership of Greece to EC membership in 1981. With
Greece as a full-member of the Community and given the nature of the bilateral conflicts outstanding between the two countries, Turkey's relations with Europe experienced a setback.
It would be unfair, however, to attribute negative developments from a Turkish perspective solely to the Greek veto which continued until 1999.
Ironically, at the time of Greek accession, Turkey experienced one of the periodic collapses of its democratic regime, at which point relations with the Community reached the lowest point in post-War history. By the time that Turkey returned to formal democracy and applied for full-membership in 1987, it was confronted with a changed Europe. The New Europe was an entity which placed far more emphasis than in the past on the quality of democracy and the achievement of civil and human rights. 4 Although Turkey, as a typical example of 'second wave democracy'; has enjoyed formal democracy, albeit with temporary interruptions, since 1950, its democratic credentials judged on the basis of 'substantive democracy' fell rather short of the standards required by the 'New Europe' of the late twentieth century.
Furthermore, the severe identity challenges represented by the emergence of militant Kurdish nationalism and the rise of political Islam have created serious strains on the Turkish political system. 5 The failure to incorporate these divisive elements peacefully into the democratic system has been synonymous with slow progress in relations with Europe. Rejection of membership application, at a time when the Community was prepared to embrace former communist countries in Eastern Europe, provided few incentives for peaceful or democratic resolution of Turkey's perennial identity conflicts. On a positive note, relations with Europe continued to develop, although at a rather gradual pace. The Customs Union Agreement that came into effect at the end of 1995 was an important turning point in this respect.
Nevertheless, judged by the standards of full-membership, the Customs Union failed to provide the mix of conditions and incentives required for a comprehensive transformation of Turkey's economic and political system. In retrospect, the Copenhagen Summit was also important in the sense that it forced Europe itself to think seriously about what Turkish membership entails. Up to that point, the prospect of Turkish membership, given the inherent difficulties in undertaking the kinds of reforms required, appeared to be a rather distant prospect that could safely be postponed into the indefinite future. Yet, the very pace of reforms in the post-Helsinki era clearly suggested that
Turkish membership had to be confronted with as a serious prospect.
The Paradoxical Role of the United States: The Importance and Limits of the American
Influence on Turkey-EU Relations
During the Cold War period, Turkey was a pivotal state for the United States. It was among the select group of countries with whom special strategic relationships had to been developed in line with fundamental American economic and security interests. 15 During the Cold War, the containment of the Soviet threat constituted the prime consideration. In the context of the late 1990s, Turkey's claim to a pivotal state status rested on its attractiveness as an 'emerging market' and its willingness to counteract terrorism (particularly in the aftermath of 9/11). The United States, right from its early stages, sought to link Turkey explicitly to the European integration process. The key objective here was to anchor Turkey firmly to the West by integrating it into its institutional settings. NATO was one of the key institutions; the EC/EU was another. The active promotion of Turkey's integration into Europe also reflected a desire on the part of the US to share the burden of responsibility in creating a strong and stable ally in a critical region of the world. Indeed, the US's attitude and commitment to Turkey's integration process with the EC/EU contrasted sharply with the far more ambiguous and lukewarm approach of the principal European states. One of the key reasons for this underlying difference is that Turkey's membership of the EU did not involve any explicit costs for the US.
The Europeans, on the other hand, had to take into account the potential costs of Turkish accessions in terms of its impact on employment prospects, community-wide budgetary transfers, Common Agricultural Policy, the decision-making process and so on. 18 Furthermore, the EU is a much more inward-oriented and much less security-oriented entity than the US. Consequently, it tends to view Turkey more as a security liability rather than as a security asset. This perception was based on the fear that the incorporation of Turkey would link the EU explicitly to a highly unstable part of the world and would import instability into the EU. 19 Clearly, a major difference could be detected in the transatlantic alliance well before the Iraqi War with the US, as a global power, putting much more emphasis on security and much less emphasis on the nature and quality of democracy than the EU. Hence, from an
American perspective the security producing credentials of Turkey were of greater importance than its immediate democratic deficits, constituting a strong basis for rapid progress towards EU accession. 20 In any case, it is fair to say that the American administrations, right up to the Iraqi War, have tended to view differences with Europe as being of marginal rather than of fundamental significance. Notably, from an American standpoint, differences pertaining to the nature of market economy and democracy were matters of detail, not constituting in any way issues of substantive divergence.
The US became increasingly active in promoting Turkey's membership aspirations for the EU from the late 1990s onwards. A number of concrete steps could be identified in this respect.
Following the disappointments of the Luxembourg Summit, the Clinton administration provided active diplomatic support for Turkish initiatives. This support was, in part, instrumental in securing a favorable outcome for Turkey at the subsequent Helsinki Summit. 21 In the aftermath of Helsinki, American support was also critical in terms of seeking a durable and mutually acceptable solution to the Cyprus dispute. 22 Furthermore American support, through the IMF, was also important in Turkey's ability to come through the deepest economic crisis of the post-War era. 23 The Copenhagen Summit of December 2002, however, clearly displayed the limits of American power in so far as decision-making regarding EU membership was concerned. Rather paradoxically, therefore, strong American support for Turkey's EU membership tended to strengthen the 'anti-EU coalition' in Turkey, meaning those who did not oppose EU membership per se but rather the political and economic conditions attached to EU membership. Indeed, such groups tended to view the US-Israel-Turkey axis as a natural basis for Turkish foreign policy and security interests and as a natural alternative to EU membership, which according to them was unlikely to be realized in any case given the conditions attached to such membership. 25 Clearly, the position of these groups in Turkish politics was fundamentally shaken by the US-led war on Iraq and the strains in TurkishAmerican relations experienced in this context.
Critical Turning Points and their Consequences for Turkey-EU Relations: 9/11, The Iraq War and the Transatlantic Rift
The tragic events of 9/11 and the fact that the United States had experienced severe acts of terrorism on its home territory for the first time in its recent history had a profound impact on the American psyche. The Bush administration enjoyed the support of the American public in developing a full front attack on international terrorism and the rogue states, notably in the Middle East, that constituted a potential home base for such activities.
While it was anticipated that after 9/11 the Bush administration would pursue a hawkish domestic and international security-oriented agenda, the perceptions of the methods, means, and ends of these policies diverged sharply between the US and a number of its key allies in Europe and elsewhere. The differences reached a climax over the crisis in Iraq. Bush While Turkey has made a giant step towards fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria by introducing key changes through legislation, implementing them in practice will be essential and still serves as the real challenge. There is evidence that the military-security establishment and their counterparts in civilian politics are rather unhappy about some of these changes. 33 Hence, in spite of signs of serious progress, there is still quite a distance to travel in terms of promoting EU related reforms at the fastest rate possible and strengthen its economy.
Moreover, it needs to pursue a pro-active policy in tackling the Cyprus dispute along the lines of a revived Annan plan. While it had its shortcomings and was not entirely satisfying for both sides, the Annan Plan presented a serious opportunity for the long-lasting Cyprus dispute to be resolved within the European context. Due to the rejection of the plan by the Greek Cypriot side, however, as stated by Alvaro de Soto, "A unique and historic chance to resolve the Cyprus problem has been missed." 40 After the political will and determination displayed by the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot governments for the reunification of the island, the pressure on Turkey regarding the Cyprus issue is mitigated. Greek-Cypriots, nevertheless, hold a strong trump card as a member of the EU. For instance, they are already pressuring Turkey for recognition and for the extension of Turkey's Customs Union with the EU to the Greek-Cypriot part of Cyprus. Once the accession negotiations start the Greek Cypriot pressure on Turkey will also be increasing. By offering asymmetric incentives and by admitting the Greek half of Cyprus as a fully fledged member state, despite its rejection of the unification plan, the EU found itself importing an old conflict, which is not limited only to
Cyprus but is linked to Greece and Turkey as well. To the dismay of Brussels, the fortified Green Line dividing the two parts of Cyprus has now become an external EU border. In the difficult path towards reaching a sustainable solution to the Cyprus problem within the EU context, the US also has a critical role to play as a balancing factor, once again underscoring the importance of improving Turkey's relations with the US.
Finally, regardless of the merits of the disagreement among the US, a number of its European allies, and Turkey concerning the war in Iraq, in its aftermath ensuring a peaceful and stable
Iraq is in the interest of all concerned. Post-conflict nation-building is an extremely complicated and complex process. While the US succeeded in achieving a swift military victory through its unilateralist approach, winning the peace and creating long-lasting stability will be the real challenge. As the almost daily attacks on the coalition forces and the wave of terrorist acts (such as the attacks on the Jordanian embassy, oil pipelines, and the UN Headquarters in Baghdad) indicate, the post-war restructuring of Iraq will indeed be a very difficult task. In tackling this challenge, in addition to genuinely and substantially involving
Iraqis themselves in the governing process, a multilateralist approach will be much more fruitful. Within this context, enhancing collaboration in all dimensions of the Turkey-US-EU triangle will be particularly helpful.
Concluding Observations
The Turkish leaders have been walking on a diplomatic tight-rope since the beginning of the crisis in Iraq and it is essential that they strike a delicate balance between Turkey's own security interests, the necessities of its close alliance with the US, its European orientation and the public demands. The rapidly deepening transatlantic fault-line between the United States and a number of key European countries presents an additional problem. Since all of these elements seem to be pulling Turkey in different directions, reconciling the differences will be an extremely challenging but crucial task. European quest, it is also critical for Turkey to mend its ties with the US.
At the same time, the security-based strategy which depends solely on the alliance with the United States and its diplomatic influence on Europe will not generate the desired outcome for Turkey-as the Copenhagen Summit aptly illustrated-unless there is the will to undertake and properly implement the required reforms. In other words, contrary to the thinking of some, American help, could not act as a substitute for reforms in the context of Turkey-EU relations.
The future of the Turkey-EU-US triangle is likely to be characterized by a mix of continuity and transformation at the same time. It is likely to display continuity in the sense that from a Turkish perspective pursuing either a totally isolationist or a partially isolationist strategy, meaning a single-minded emphasis on developing relations either with the US or EU, will not be a viable approach. Indeed, one of our central claims is that developing close relations with one of these major entities is likely to have positive payoffs in terms of deepening relations with the other major bloc. The extent and nature of this impact, however, will also be determined by the delicate dynamics of the transatlantic relations itself. Even though the Bush administration has gained a mandate for a second term, there are both domestic and external constraints that limit the degree of unilateral action with respect to American foreign policy.
The policies of the Bush government during its second term, particularly whether it would continue to pursue hawkish and unilateralist policies in the Middle East or whether it would have a more multilateralist approach would have a significant impact on the bilateral relations as well as the future of the US-Turkey-EU triangle.
The very nature of the triangle is also likely to experience a significant transformation.
Deepening relations with the EU require a parallel deepening of the reform process. American support per se is not likely to generate smooth progress towards EU membership in the absence of radical commitment and implementation of economic and political reforms.
Deepening relations with the EU, in turn, will offer Turkey the prospect of reconstituting its relations with the United States, which will be more in line with its national interests and which will also enable it to play a more constructive role in the broader Middle East as a benign regional power. 
